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FROM WASHINGTON

TO AIG 6006, 6007

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NATO CONFIDENTIAL FROM WASHINGTON

POLITICAL ANALYSIS: SOME POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE
NEW USSR-GDR TREATY

1. THE USSR-GDR TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SIGNED IN MOSCOW, OCTOBER 7, MARKS A NEW
PHASE IN THE EAST GERMAN FACET OF SOVIET POWER POLITICS.
THE PREDECESSOR 1964 TREATY HAD CODIFIED EAST GERMANY'S
STATUS IN LIGHT OF THE 1961 BERLIN CRISIS AND THE SUB-
SEQUENT ABANDONMENT OF THE PUSH FOR A GERMAN PEACE TREATY.
THAT TREATY HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED AS KHRUSHCHEV PREPARED
TO VISIT THE FRG, AND RUMORS OF AN IMPENDING "NORMALIZATION"
OF FRG-USSR RELATIONS WERE RIFE.

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2. THE NEW TREATY FOLLOWS THE OSTPOLITIK AGREEMENTS AND
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE (CSCE), WHICH IN EFFECT
LEGITIMIZED EAST GERMANY'S EXISTENCE AS A STATE. FOR THE
GDR, THE TREATY CODIFIES THAT INTERNATIONAL STATUS. THE

QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER THE SOVIETS ALSO CONSIDER IT THE NECESSARY PRELIMINARY TO NEW INITIATIVES INVOLVING BONN.

3. THE NEW TREATY SIGNIFIES THAT:

(A)--THE PROCESS OF EAST GERMANY'S SELECTIVE INTEGRATION WITH THE USSR WILL BE INTENSIFIED, CONVERTING IT EVEN MORE INTO AN EXTENSION OF THE USSR ON THE FLANKS OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP.

(B)--REGARDLESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS THAT BOTH HAVE SIGNED, THE USSR AND THE GDR REMAIN COMMITTED TO THEIR OWN SPECIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF BERLIN ISSUES AND OF BORDER INVIOABILITY, AND WILL PERSIST IN SEEKING TO REGISTER THOSE INTERPRETATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE.

(C)--THE TOTALITY OF INTEGRATIVE COOPERATION AND COMMONALITY ENVISAGED IN THE TREATY SUGGESTS THAT THE GDR IS BEING FITTED OUT FOR A MORE INDEPENDENT-SEEMING ROLE ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE AS A TIGHTLY CONTROLLED SOVIET AGENCY. END SUMMARY.

4. SOCIALIST COOPERATION: THE NEW TREATY'S PROVISIONS ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE SOCIALIST CAMP, AND BILATERALLY BETWEEN THE GDR AND THE USSR, COVER ROUGHLY THE SAME GROUND AS DID THE 1964 TREATY, BUT THE EMPHASIS ON COOPERATION PER SE IS SIGNIFICANTLY HEIGHTENED. THE AREAS CITED--EDUCATION, CULTURE, ARTS, MEDIA, HEALTH, TOURISM, AND PEOPLES, AS WELL AS THE ECONOMIC REALM OF PLAN COORDINATION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION, SPECIALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT--ARE ONES IN WHICH USSR-GDR COOPERATION IS ALREADY EXTENSIVE AND LONGSTANDING. HOW THESE ARE TO BE INTENSIFIED EVEN FURTHER WILL BE A MATTER FOR BILATERAL NEGOTIATION, BUT WHAT MOSCOW ACHIEVES FROM THE GERMANS WILL EVENTUALLY BE DEMANDED OF THE OTHER EAST EUROPEAN CONFIDENTIAL

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REGIMES.

5. PROMOTION OF A CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND MEDIA CONFORMITY BETWEEN EAST BERLIN AND MOSCOW HAS OBVIOUS LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE IN SHAPING NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS. WITHIN THE SHORTER TERM, IT IS THE INTENSIFIED BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION THAT CAN BE EXPECTED TO HAVE MORE OF AN IMPACT, AS THAT IS EAST BERLIN'S ONLY AREA OF DIRECT LEVERAGE VIS-A-VIS MOSCOW. BECAUSE THAT LEVERAGE IS FAST ERODING WITH THE GROWING LOPSIDEDNESS OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND ITS EAST EUROPEAN PARTNERS, THE EAST GERMANS CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPLOIT WHAT REMAINS QUICKLY, AND WITH DOGGED PERSISTENCE.

6. BUT THE TREATY ALSO ADDS A FURTHER DIMENSION TO "SOCIALIST COOPERATION" THAT WAS NOT IN THE 1964 MODEL--BILATERAL CONSULTATION AND ACTION ON THE BASIS OF JOINT AGREED POSITIONS ON "ALL IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS" (ARTICLE 9). AGREEMENT WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT FOR A UNIFIED STANCE ON MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUES HAS CONSISTENTLY ELUDED MOSCOW; INDEED, THE PACT'S POLITICAL COUNCIL HAS MET ONLY ONCE IN THREE YEARS BECAUSE OF ITS MEMBERSHIP'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE SOVIET INTEREST IN POLITICAL CONFORMITY.

7. EVIDENTLY THE USSR IS NOW MORE DETERMINED THAN EVER TO ATTACK THAT PROBLEM THROUGH BILATERAL CHANNELS. UNDERTAKINGS SIMILAR TO EAST GERMANY'S HAVE ALREADY BEEN DEMANDED OF THE OTHER EAST EUROPEANS, AND PROVISIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATION EXIST IN MOST OF THE OTHER BILATERAL TREATIES IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER. MOSCOW INTENDS TO HAVE ITS EUROPEAN SOCIALIST CAMP SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, OR AS CLOSE TO ONE AS IS ACHIEVABLE, AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BE DIVERTED FROM THAT GOAL BY LACK OF WARSAW PACT UNANIMITY.

8. MILITARY AID: THE SIGNIFICANCE THAT SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE ARTICLE 8 PROVISION FOR MUTUAL AID, "INCLUDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE," IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK ON EITHER PARTY "BY ANY STATE OR GROUP OF STATES" IS NOT YET CLEAR. THE 1964 TREATY HAD REFERRED ONLY TO ATTACKS CONFIDENTIAL

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"IN EUROPE," WITH THE REQUISITE AID DESCRIBED MERELY AS HAVING TO BE "IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF THE WARSAW PACT TREATY," AND THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE NEW TREATY, IN EFFECT, EXTENDS THE PURVIEW OF THE WARSAW PACT BEYOND ITS ORIGINAL EUROPEAN FOCUS. PRESSURE CAN NOW BE EXPECTED ON THE OTHER PACT MEMBERS WHO HAVE NOT YET DONE SO (POLAND PARTICULARLY) TO FOLLOW SUIT IN THEIR BILATERAL UNDERTAKINGS WITH MOSCOW. IN EFFECT, THIS PROCEDURE WOULD AMEND THE MULTILATERAL WARSAW TREATY IN THIS REGARD VIA A MULTIPLICITY OF BILATERAL UNDERTAKINGS.

9. THE USSR HARDLY REGARDS A CZECH, OR EVEN AN EAST GERMAN, MILITARY CONTRIBUTION AS VITAL TO ITS DEFENSE POSTURE OUTSIDE EUROPE. YET A BROADENING OF THE PACT'S ORIGINAL FRAME OF REFERENCE--CONFINED TO EUROPE AND TO A WEST GERMAN-RELATED ATTACK--COULD OPEN THE WAY FOR A MONGOLIAN OR OTHER COMMUNIST STATE'S ASSOCIATION WITH THE WARSAW ALLIANCE.

10. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE TREATY'S SIGNATURE SUGGEST THAT MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

WERE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE RELEVANT NEGOTIATIONS. THE GDR DEFENSE MINISTER ARRIVED IN MOSCOW SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE HONECKER'S OFFICIAL STATE AND PARTY DELEGATION AND BROUGHT WITH HIM A LARGE ENTOURAGE THAT WAS EXTENSIVELY AND DEMONSTRATIVELY FETTERED BY THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. NO ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE AS TO THE PURPOSE OF THEIR LENGTHY STAY, BUT TOP-LEVEL SOVIET-EAST GERMAN MILITARY COORDINATION APPARENTLY WAS REQUIRED FOR WHATEVER WAS BEING WORKED OUT AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL.

11. QUIDS AND QUOS: IN ANY EVENT, IT IS OF SOME INTEREST THAT THE NEW TREATY'S ARTICLES ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK, AND ON COORDINATED ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PROVISIONS PLEDGING "IMMUTABILITY" RATHER THAN "INVIOABILITY" OF FRONTIERS (ARTICLE 6) AND CONCERNING THE STATUS OF WEST BERLIN (ARTICLE 7). THE JUXTAPOSITION RAISES THE LIKELIHOOD THAT A TRADEOFF WAS INVOLVED, WITH EAST GERMAN CONFIDENTIAL

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CONCESSIONS ON THE TWO FORMER ISSUES IN RETURN FOR SOVIET COMMITMENTS ON ARTICLES 6 AND 7.

12. THE LATTER TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE POLITICAL CHANGES WROUGHT BY OSTPOLITIK ON THE GERMAN SCENE. WHERE IN 1964 BOTH SIDES AGREE TO REGARD WEST BERLIN AS A "SEPARATE POLITICAL ENTITY," THE NEW DOCUMENT DESIGNATES THE 1971 QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN AS THE OPERATIVE FACTOR IN THE MAINTENANCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS WITH WEST BERLIN. BUT IT QUALIFIES THIS UNDERTAKING SIGNIFICANTLY WITH AN ADDITIONAL CLAUSE: "...PROCEEDING FROM THE FACT THAT IT (WEST BERLIN) IS NOT A PART OF THE FRG AND THAT ALSO IN THE FUTURE IT WILL NOT BE GOVERNED BY IT."

13. BERLIN REVISIONISM: THIS QUALIFICATION REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIVE REVISION OF THE ACTUAL QUADRIPARTITE TEXT--A REVISION THAT EAST BERLIN HAS BEEN TRYING TO REGISTER SINCE THE QA WAS FIRST SIGNED. THE 1971 AGREEMENT SPECIFIED THAT THE WESTERN SECTORS (OF BERLIN) "CONTINUE NOT TO BE A CONSTITUENT PART OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND NOT BE GOVERNED BY IT," A DELIBERATE (AND HARD-FOUGHT) COMPROMISE FORMULA RECONCILING IRRECONCILABLE SOVIET AND WESTERN VIEWS ON WEST BERLIN'S LEGAL TIES TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. GDR OBJECTIONS STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT THIS FORMULA PRESERVES A LEGALITY FOR WESTERN CONTENTIONS THAT ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER BERLIN REMAINS UNDECIDED, WITH BONN'S CLAIM TO THE WESTERN SECTORS THUS STILL VALID, ALBEIT IN SUSPENSE BY VIRTUE OF A 1949 ALLIED INTERVENTION.

14. SINCE MOSCOW HAS NOW FINALLY AGREED TO ENDORSE THE EAST GERMAN POSITION IN AN INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENT, IT SEEMS

PROBABLE THAT THE SOVIETS, URGED ON BY THE EAST GERMANS, HAVE AGREED TO TAKE A MORE RIGID STANCE TOWARD ANY MANIFESTATION OF FEDERAL LINKS WITH WEST BERLIN FROM NOW ON. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, BOTH PARTIES EVIDENTLY INTEND TO HEW TO THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE QA AND HAVE NO DESIRE FOR NEW CRISES IN BERLIN.

15. FOR THE MOMENT, SOVIET-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS STAND TO
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SUFFER AS A RESULT. THE GDR WILL SEEK TO TIE SOVIET HANDS WHEREVER BERLIN OR BERLIN-RELATED INTERESTS ARISE IN USSR-FRG DEALINGS, REGARDLESS OF WHAT COMMITMENTS THE USSR ALREADY MAY HAVE MADE TO BONN ON THIS SCORE (SEVERAL EVIDENTLY WERE MADE IN ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS AND ARE NOW BEING "UNDONE"). STILL, THE FACT THAT THE USSR WOULD BE WILLI TO PAY THE PRICE OF THIS COMPLICATION IN ITS FRG RELATIONS

SUGGESTS THAT DEMANDS OF CONSIDERABLE MAGNITUDE ARE BEING LEVIED ON GDR INTERESTS. THE TREATY'S NEW COMMITMENT TO "IMMUTABILITY" FOR EAST GERMANY'S FRONTIER WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IMPLIES THAT SOME OF THOSE DEMANDS PERTAIN TO INNER-GERMAN RELATIONSHIPS.

16. BORDER IMMUTABILITY: THE FRIENDSHIP TREATY'S ARTICLE 6 IN EFFECT REGISTERS MOSCOW'S OWN SPECIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CSCE PRINCIPLES CONCERNING EUROPEAN FRONTIERS. WHERE THE HELSINKI DOCUMENT SPOKE ONLY OF "INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS, THE USSR-GDR TREATY SPEAKS ALSO OF THE "IMMUTABILITY" OF ALL THOSE STEMMING FROM WORLD WAR II. THIS TERMINOLOGY WOULD SEEM TO NEGATE ANY PROSPECT OF "PEACEFUL CHANGE" OF FRONTIERS AS THE CSCE PRINCIPLES ALSO SANCTIONED.

17. MOREOVER, THE NEW TREATY GUARANTEES THIS IMMUTABILITY "JOINTLY, AND IN ALLIANCE WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT TREATY...AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH IT." THE 1964 TREATY HAD MERELY GUARANTEED THE INVIOABILITY OF ONLY THE GDR'S BORDERS AND THEN "IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WARSAW PA TREATY."

18. IN EFFECT, THE USSR AND THE GDR HAVE TAKEN IT UPON THEMSELVES TO BAR ANY CHANGE OF FRONTIERS FOR ANY WARSAW PACT STATE INSOFAR AS THOSE BORDERS DATE FROM WORLD WAR II. HOW THE OTHER PACT MEMBERS LIKE THIS ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY CAN ONLY BE A MATTER OF SPECULATION. BUT THE GDR NOW HAS A DIRECT SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE PERMANENCE OF THE FRG-GDR BORDER; PREVIOUSLY, DEFENSE OF THAT

BORDER TECHNICALLY REQUIRED WARSAW PACT UNANIMITY. THE

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IMPLICIT SOVIET GUARANTEE OF EAST GERMANY'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY THUS TAKES A MORE SPECIFICALLY LEGAL CAST IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, AT LEAST AS FAR AS THE EAST GERMANS ARE CONCERNED.

19. REUNIFICATION? ALL OBSERVERS HAVE NOTED THAT THE OCTOBER 7 TREATY, UNLIKE ITS 1964 PREDECESSOR, CONTAINED NO REFERENCES TO REUNIFICATION OR TO A GERMAN PEACE TREATY. THE THRUST OF THE DOCUMENT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT MOSCOW CONSIDERS THAT THE OSTPOLITIK AGREEMENTS AND CSCE ACCOMPLISHED ALL THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE WAY OF A WORLD WAR II PEACE TREATY. OMISSION OF ANY REFERENCE TO REUNIFICATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY, HOWEVER, THAT THAT ISSUE TOO HAS BECOME INOPERATIVE. THE TREATY'S STRESS ON IMMUTABILITY OF EXISTING FRONTIERS DOES APPEAR, OF COURSE, TO PUT AN OFFICIAL QUIETUS TO THE TRADITIONAL IDEA OF MERGING TWO STATES INTO ONE LARGER REICH (ALTHOUGH SUCH REUNIFICATION PROBABLY WAS JUST AS UNREALISTIC A PROSPECT EVEN WHEN IT WAS BEING FORMALLY ENDORSED IN EASTERN DOCUMENTS).

20. YET, THE TREATY UPHOLDS THE OSTPOLITIK UNDERTAKINGS, WHICH SANCTION AND LEGITIMIZE A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANY, A RELATIONSHIP THAT BOTH MOSCOW AND EAST BERLIN EVIDENTLY INTEND TO EXPAND AND INTENSIFY IN WHAT COULD AMOUNT TO AN UNACKNOWLEDGED REUNIFYING PROCESS. THE DIALECTIC IMPLICIT HERE ADDS PERTINENCE TO THE OBSERVATION THAT A SOVIET OFFICIAL RECENTLY MADE TO AN FRG DIPLOMAT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NEW TREATY SIMPLY REFLECTED THE PRESENT STATE OF SOVIET-GDR RELATIONS; "FORMALLY" THE OLDER SOVIET TREATIES WITH EAST GERMANY "ARE NOT INVALID." NOR, EVIDENTLY, ARE THEIR PROVISIONS NECESSARILY DEAD. KISSINGER

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